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By almost any measure, Angola is a country undergoing profound change.
Today, the juxtaposition of old and new overwhelms visitors to the capital of Luanda, where construction cranes dominate the ever-changing skyline.
Advertisements for the Banco de Fomento de Angola (BFA) 2 , one of the largest banks in Angola, show male and female celebrities perched on an iron girder dangling from a crane high above the city, exhorting passers-by to "Grow with Angola".
One of the few constants throughout Angola's many post-independence upheavals has been the presence of the ruling Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) , which has been under the leadership of President José Eduardo dos Santos since 1979. In fact, the MPLA and its leader have emerged from each successive period of change with a stronger hold on power than before. The structure of Angola's economy, which is heavily dependent on rents from petroleum, has sustained the system of presidential patronage that has allowed the party and its president to survive. For that reason, despite the double-digit growth of the past decade interrupted only briely by the global inancial crisis , the structure of the economy has also remained a constant, to the detriment of the average citizen.
To use the terminology of Samir Amin (1974 Amin ( , 1976 Angola's economy is only peripherally connected to the global capitalist system. While it imports goods and exports resources, its economy is predominantly non-capitalist in that there has not been widespread proletarianisation. In recent decades, Angola has transitioned from a centrally-planned one-party state to a (nominally) multiparty (quasi) market economy. Steve Kibble (2006) writes that the "politics of disorder" predominated in post-war Angola and suited the Angolan elite as they proclaimed transition for "outside cosmetic purposes" (p. 525). In fact, the nearuniversal view in the academy, and, at least privately, amongst other Angolawatchers, is that litle has changed in the political economy of "ngola since
Christine Messiant described it in 1992 as a system of "clientelist redistribution" (Messiant, 1992 cited in Hodges, 2004 . However, a careful reading of Angola's various transitions shows that each has involved small shifts in strategies of elite accumulation in order to maintain the status quo, or indeed, to deepen the internal concentration of power and wealth.
This paper hypothesizes that Angola may be at the beginning of a more fundamental shift in its political economy; away from the peripheral rentier economy that has developed since independence and towards an indigenous system of capitalist accumulation. The paper does not explore the Angolan economy as a whole. Rather, by focusing on recent developments in the oil and oil services sectors, it is argued that the beginnings of a shift from rentierism and more primitive methods of accumulation in the oil industry can now be discerned from an analysis of strategies of elite accumulation. Furthermore, the possibility is very real that this transformation will continue to grow in strength over time given policies of "local content", or "Angolanisation". Far from heralding the glorious coming of development under capitalism, the tendency of the transition as it is currently envisioned is towards continued underdevelopment and accumulation by dispossession fuelled by the further entrenchment of the power of the Angolan elite and increasingly unequal distribution of wealth under the emerging social relations of production and accumulation.
Elite accumulation in Angola: a historical approach
Beginning in the mid-1980s, the ruling MPLA underwent a transition culminating in with the decision by the Central Commitee to end the one-party system and to formally abandon Marxism-Leninism and embrace economic liberalisation. Ferreira (1995) argues that Angola's petroleum nomenklatura was not quick to embrace such fundamental change. Rather, the politics of rentierism and the elite's ability to pillage the state allowed them to resist change until it became inevitable.
For Ferreira, these events ushered in a period of transition from 1991-92 during which the nomenklatura adapted to the market economy and economic liberalisation. By 1993 By -1994 , this "reconversion" was complete and the nomenklatura had successfully adapted without signiicantly altering their source of wealth, which remained petroleum rents. This was done through a shift in accumulation strategies to embrace privatisation. Ferreira concludes:
The economic reconversion of the nomenklatura is today almost complete : on the ideological and political front, the acceptance of the functioning of a democracy In what has become perhaps the deinitive statement on the political economy of Angola into the post-war transition, Hodges (2004) describes a system where The rent from oil is used primarily to satisfy elite interests and inance means of retaining power, through expenditure of security and patronage, rather than to cadernos de estudos africanos • janeiro-junho de • , -promote social and economic development " (p. 203) . In this system, patronage lows directly from the top -the Oice of the President. President dos Santos uses all the powers of his oice to reward loyalty in symbiotic patron-client relationships that are highly toxic to the country. The result, described by Kibble (2006) , is a state where few citizens have access to clean water, health, education, public order, justice, energy, and infrastructure.
There is surprising uniformity in the picture painted of the Angolan elite.
Hodges (2004) argues that corruption is "endemic throughout the public administration", and even takes on some of the language of Marxist political economy when he says that corruption at higher levels is "part of the process of 'primitive accumulation' by the politically connected elites" (p. 83). In their 2005 Drivers of Change report, Vines, Shaxson and Rimli (2005) write: "Angola's economy is strongly controlled by a presidency that wields power through personalised networks which, as in many African and other countries, can be more important than the ministries and other formal institutions" (p. 7).
Hodges (2004) describes several strategies of direct and indirect elite accumulation used in Angola in the post-Marxist-Leninist period. Indirect appropriation occurs through manipulation of exchange rate policy, interest rates and access to credit. For example, until 1999, the government used privileged access to the administratively-set oicial exchange rate to enrich the elite and transfer state resources to individual beneiciaries. More direct methods of elite accumulation described by Hodges include privatisation and land reform, as well as base looting of state cofers. Much of this privatisation occurred without proper valuations of the assets or competitive bidding 3 . Meanwhile, as Hodges notes, many army oicers and state oicials acquired farms and other businesses as political favours, often for nominal sums or no payment at all, under a large land privatisation programme that began in the early 1990s.
Finally, Hodges (2004) notes that, over time, restrictions on competition, and the Angolanisation of the economy have become increasingly important strategies of elite accumulation. At the same time, the elite's incorporation into domestic and international circuits of capital has become increasingly important to their enrichment -particularly as aforementioned strategies, such as the exchange rate policy and allocation of credit, waned. Central to the new strategy is the climate of oligopolistic or monopolistic market conditions created by import procedures, other forms of administrative favouritism, and harassment of businesses by the Polícia Económica.
Sonangol's role as a vehicle for presidential patronage, particularly in terms of access to business opportunities, is mentioned by many authors, most notably Soares de Oliveira (2007a), who writes:
In short, the Sonangol Group has been not only the manager of the Futungo's phantom revenue lows, but also the enabler of elite rentierism across important non-oil dimensions of the domestic economy, simultaneously guaranteeing that all profitable business opportunities are arbitrated by state rulers via the company (pp.
608-609).
In , Hodges conirmed that increasingly the elite are relying on their previously accumulated wealth and preferential access to the state to the extent that the patronage system has moved into a phase where some wealthy Angolans who beneited from earlier phases of accumulation and privatisation can now take advantage of their ties to the presidency to beneit from the government's policy of Angolanisation, whereby they can participate directly in the oil industry through the establishment of service companies. Sonangol, in turn, pressures oil operators to contract to these companies. At the same time, he writes that kick-backs on government contracts and the straight diversion of state resources to private individuals and companies continue to be important mechanisms of surplus appropriation, made possible by the general opaqueness of public inances and the secrecy of oil-guaranteed loans. Taken together, it is clear that the literature on Angola does reveal several periods of political-economic change and a process of increasing complexity in strategies of elite accumulation.
Towards the reinvention of the Angolan elite
Beginning with the work of Ferreira, scholarship on the accumulation strategies of the Angolan elite shows a remarkable capacity on behalf of the elite to adapt and reinvent themselves as necessary to suit changed geopolitical realities.
Today, as the elite reinvent themselves, there is reason to question whether even the opaqueness of public inance, the "ermuda Triangle described by Hodges 5 Some recent developments in the Angolan drive to gain international legitimacy include the country obtaining an average "+ sovereign rating with positive outlook from three rating classiication agencies in May which removes the need to seek oil-backed loans), the negotiation of a stand-by arrangement with the IMF in November 2009, worth an estimated US$1.4bn, moves to publish more data related to the economy and the oil sector (despite all the limitations described by Global Witness, 2011) , and the passage of the Law on Public Probity in 2010 despite its many laws .
Exploring the case of Senegal, Boone suggests that, in light of evidence she collected that in certain cases the political class is willing and able to use state power to promote local capital accumulation and local investment in industry, "arguments to the efect that these social strata are invariably comprador in character can no longer be accepted" (p. 185).
Noting that her scenario is contingent on "the emergence of a class or part of a class commited to a bourgeois project, the consolidation and efective exercise of its political power, and the existence of a state with the institutional and political capacities needed to promote efectively the interests of nascent indigenous capitalist strata , "oone writes that in most of "frica, no signiicant stratum or fraction of the wealth-accumulating political class invests in productive activities… in these situations, political classes are predominantly 'rentier' in nature". She explains that while indigenising capital accumulation is in the interest of "some" political classes, the political project of consolidating internal political dominance and retaining control over the state apparatus is central in all cases (Boone, 1998, p. . "oone's argument suggests that to ind a regime that nurtures capitalist development, there would need to be a consolidated political class and a strong incentive to promote productive activity.
Of course, patronage can still play an important role in this type of capitalist transformation. In "oone's work, clientelism is identiied as an important feature of rentierism, which is contrasted with indigenising capital accumulation.
In the case of Angola, rentierism and the indigenisation of capital accumulation go hand-in-hand, since Angolanisation is, as Hodges notes, an increasingly important mechanism of elite accumulation. To be sure, the indigenous oil services sector, which is the focus of this study, is not yet signiicant in terms of importance to the Angolan economy, nor to the investment strategies of most elites.
However, if local capitalism is to emerge in Angola, there are several reasons that it is more likely to do so in oil services irst.
What follows is a study of the potential of the oil services sector in Angola to transform from rentierism to local capitalism. It must be left for a later project to extend that analysis to the rest of the Angolan economy. One of the key reasons to look irst at the oil services sector is that local content in the oil and gas industry is one of the only mechanisms of economic protection with acceptance and legitimacy in the eyes of international capital. Additionally, the oil sector has the potential for many more backward and forward linkages than is commonly understood. These include opportunities to provide business services, rent common and specialized equipment, and produce a wide variety of materials, chemicals, and parts. In many cases, these new business opportunities have the poten- Leys, 1994, p. 25) . Of course, it may be a very long time before social relations in Angola are predominantly or even primarily capitalistic in nature.
This also depends on the extent to which the transformations in the oil sector described below are also occurring in the economy as a whole. Nevertheless, given the importance of the oil sector to the Angolan economy, the important point is whether or not a signiicant shift may be occurring or about to occur in that sector.
Local/national content in Angola's oil industry
Before examining the altered political economic context, it is necessary to review the basics of local content 6 in "ngola's oil industry. Local content is signiicant because it provides a legal basis for facilitating the entry of Angolan companies into the oil industry. In Angola, local content has developed along two separate paths. Angolanisation, which refers primarily to promoting the employment of Angolans in the oil sector, dates back to legislation from the early 1980s 7 . Today, while the law has been rewriten, "ngolanisation remains a project of The oil services sector is all but ignored by most economic analyses. For example, in Vines, Shaxson and Rimli (2005) , the economy is analysed in three parts: "the non-oil, non-diamond economy"; "the oil sector"; and "the diamond sector". In the section on the oil economy, there is no mention of oil services.
Similarly, in a 2011 United Nations report on industrial development in Africa (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], 2011), there was no mention of the potential for development through oil services (which includes manufacturing and heavy industry). Even a recent IMF study on "The
Linkage between the Oil and the Non-oil Sectors" (Klein, 2010) , failed to mention oil services.
Local content has been a focus of economic policy throughout sub-Saharan Africa, given the successes of Norway, Brazil and Malaysia. While increased local content seems likely to spur economic development, it is not often analysed in terms of social or political development. Given the context of "ngola, local/ national content seems equally likely to reinforce the power and wealth of the elite of the MPLA and the high-ups in Sonangol. This concern makes it all the more pressing to question what kind of society this transformation might create given the dynamics of power in Angola. However, before such questions can be asked, the evidence of the transformation must be evaluated.
Quantitative evidence of a growing Angolan economy
The primary evidence used to determine economic growth is data related to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As mentioned above, GDP growth was booming until the inancial crisis hit in . In , The Economist published data showing that Angola had the world's highest GDP growth rate in the past decade.
Although this statistic (and GDP growth rates in general) become less impressive when one examines where Angola was a decade ago, the trend is still important in creating conditions under which a transition could take place. Despite some diferences, key estimates and projections for GDP growth in Angola show a return to healthy economic growth, if not the spectacular expansion of 2005-2007. The data excludes most oil investment, since this investment is made under the terms of the PSAs and also excludes all public investment (including private investment from China under the loan arrangements with China Exim Bank). Some new investment in the oil services sector is captured in the data, although a large portion of this investment also occurs through the PSAs. In the raw data provided by ANIP, some investment in the category of Business Services is speciically tagged as being related to the oil industry. This data is captured in Table  . The igures represent only a small portion of new investment in oil services however they do show a signiicant increase in both foreign and domestic investment. 
Local content and elite accumulation in Angola: a qualitative approach
Taken together, the data shows strong growth in the economy and in investment by both Angolans and foreign investors. However, in the context of Angola, quantitative evidence is only useful to complement what must be shown qualitatively. Therefore, I conducted a series of interviews in Angola with key informants from civil society, government, and the oil industry 11 . Through interviews 11 The research was conducted from May to September of as part of my dissertation ieldwork. " total of iftynine (59) separate open-ended interviews were conducted with sixty-four (64) interview subjects, both Angolans and foreigners. With the exception of one interview conducted by phone with a subject living in Europe, all interviews took place in person in either Luanda or Cabinda. Relecting the skew in "ngolan society and particularly in the industry, . % of the interviewees were male. Key informants were identiied using a snowball methodology.
scape for the development of capitalist social relations centred in the oil industry.
The nature of doing business in "ngola makes inding "ngolan business people extremely diicult. It was therefore well into the second month of research before I was able to break through and arrange series of interviews with
Angolan businessmen in the oil and oil services sector
12
. In my irst interview, the owner of an Angolan oil services company told me:
In most countries you see that people that have their own companies, their own businesses, don't mind saying what they have, how many companies they haveif they have a company, how many workers they have, how much they sell, how much they do. Here in Angola you don't see anyone telling you that they have a group of companies -how many workers they have, how much taxes they pay.
Nobody will tell you that. People tend to do everything very secretly
13
.
Since 1990, a particular group of Angolans -generally those with a background in Sonangol -have started up oil exploration and production companies as well as companies providing services to the international oil companies operating in "ngola. However, as one such businessman conided to me, "ngolan businessmen generally make their money of of trading/export-import businesses and also domestic trading (i.e. buying in Luanda, selling to the provinces).
Based on his own ethnographic research into the business climate in Angola, Mez refers to two separate spaces in "ngola's market economy the privileged market economy for elite and state-owned irms and restrained market economy" (for small, medium and micro enterprises). Given this dynamic, it is not surprising that in 2008 the World Bank ranked Angola 168 th in the world in terms of ease of doing business.
According to an economic reporter for one of Angola's independent newspapers, "In Angola, corruption functions by the connection between politics and business"
14
. The irst "ngolan businessman I interviewed described a particularly inhospitable climate for Angolan entrepreneurs in which to supply to the government one must currently be in the government. It is a climate in which it 12 My position as a white male, foreigner and non-native speaker of Portuguese was both positive and negative for the research. No doubt it had a signiicant impact on who I was able to speak to and what they said. Therefore, the results relect a particular standpoint and are framed by the theoretical lens through which I understand them. My standpoint is articulated not to invalidate the evidence, since all qualitative and quantitative data are collected by some person or group with a particular subjective position. Rather, it is to help the reader interpret the evidence and evaluate its explanatory power. 13 Interview, July 2010. Obviously, the validity of comparing emerging capitalism in Angola to its emergence in Europe is of limited value given the vast diferences in historical context. However, this comparison does show that the emergence of capitalism, far from the rosy picture painted by some enthusiasts, is a messy process. The above-mentioned member of the elite put it well when he admited We are the sons of rich fathers. We are behaving terribly -like spoiled kids" 16 .
Paul Kennedy writes: "In a capitalist economy, it might be highly desirable, To establish whether or not there is movement towards capitalist production, it is necessary to determine whether there is any sign that wealthy Angolans 15 Interview, July 2010. 16 Ibid.
are investing more of their money (whether or not it was illicitly accumulated) into the country. It is not necessary to assume that the elite would be doing this because they are no longer solely interested in their own reproduction but in the development of the Angolan economy. To the contrary, the point of this essay is to show how new conjunctural forces bring the goals of the elite more in line with the promotion of nurture capitalism.
The quantitative data above from ANIP hints at such movement, but cannot present a satisfying case on its own. Soares de Oliveria (2007b) has clearly documented a tendency for the elite to move rents from oil abroad, as have many other authors. However, one prominent Angolan economist responded: "I am convinced this will change in ten years. Angolans will become more interested in investing in our economy rather than investing abroad… We do already have rich people who put their money in agriculture, construction, and manufacturing" 17 . " move by the "ngolan elite to invest more at home was also conirmed by Some of the sectors in which there has been local growth, according to Amaral, include insurance and banking. However, Amaral noted that some of this was by imposition and that this growth has occurred despite limitations in the way the system is set up to allow for such investment. Similar to other interviewees, and mirroring Mez's description of the business climate in "ngola as savage capitalism", Amaral described this emerging entrepreneurship as "a very wild kind of capitalism", arguing "We need more rules, but these rules can't be created on day zero. They have to be created and also implemented. They need to be known around the country -not just in Luanda" 19 .
Underscoring the idea that Angola has entered a new moment for both domes- . This statement demonstrates the same idea or impression that is communicated through the BFA advertisements described at the beginning of this paper "ngola as a dynamic and atractive place for investors.
High-level corruption as a feature of emerging capitalism in Angola
In recent years, blatant examples of oicial corruption at the highest levels of the Angolan government have been documented in the public sphere, exposing the extent to which the "ngolan elite have abused their oicial positions for new business opportunities. As the anti-corruption crusader Rafael Marques de Morais a puts it, "ngola's top state oicials ignore the distinction between public and private property and turn themselves into the country's top entrepreneurs". In a separate article, Marques de Morais (2012b) describes exactly how this system works:
The President has established a special task force within the intelligence services, which selects, distributes and oversees business opportunities for certain political and social igures, reward loyalists, co-opt dissenters, enrich certain families, and ensure a vertical and tight control of the patronage system to maintain the status quo... Furthermore, most of the relevant foreign investments in the country are made through joint ventures with companies owned by the presidential family and the ruling elite, which helps to secure international support and complicity through corruption (pp. 6-7).
Marques has been at the forefront of exposing oicial corruption in "ngola 
Case studies of emergent capitalism in the Angolan oil industry
The most efective way to collect data on whether or not any kind of transformation is occurring in strategies of elite accumulation, or to detect change or potential change in modes of production in Angola, is to paint a picture of the sector through case studies. Case selection was at least partially done on the basis of opportunities presented. Overall, the evidence of movement towards domestic capitalist accumulation through the production of value through secondary economic activity in oil exploration and production (as opposed to accumulation through rent-seeking), is mixed. As one informant warned, there is a world of diference between greater investment and greater productive investment.
Additionally, while the cases below show some level of dynamism and a clear desire to engage in capitalist accumulation, the process is still at a very early stage, with many companies expressing litle more than an intention to change their business model. At the same time, examples persist of companies set up by "ngolans with litle interest in moving beyond rent seeking behaviour.
cadernos de estudos africanos • janeiro-junho de • , - Of the eight cases summarised in Table , the irst three are "ngolan oil exploration and production (E&P) companies 22 . There are few companies in the E&P business, and they are all quite small. Companies in E&P generally fall under one of two categories. On the one hand, some are looking to build their knowledge, experience and capacity to be able to undertake more activities themselves. Such companies are actively seeking to make a proit from working in the sector and operating small ventures -generally onshore or in shallow water since this is much less capital intensive. There are only one or two private domestic E&P companies in Angola that would fall into this category. On the other hand, there are companies set up by powerful members of the elite without experience in the oil sector as opposed to the companies atempting to build capacity, which are set up by powerful members of the elite with a background in the sector). As in the case of Nazaki Oil and Gáz, these "ngolans are looking to proit from small holdings in deep ofshore blocks operated by others that they have accessed through their political connections and hope to proit from the rents accruing. There are 22 For reasons of conidentiality and to protect the interests and well-being of the informants that participated in my research given the climate of secrecy and unfreedom that pervades in Angola, individuals and company names are not identiied in the case studies, though they may be identiiable by people familiar with the indus-over a dozen such companies in Angola, though many are now dormant. Most are very opaque. They are, as one informant quipped, litle more than bank accounts. In truth, not only have these companies been unproductive, they have also largely been unproitable because the people running them lack appreciation of the complexity and volatility of the international oil industry. Given the lack of publicly available information, it was initially very diicult to learn anything about the ownership of these companies. However, by the end of my research I had gathered some information from sources about the ownership of most of them. In most cases, though I could not get enough information to verify or prove what one or two sources were telling me, I feel that that information I collected on ownership has ofered me a glimpse into ownership paterns and political connections in the "ngolan domestic oil and gas industry.
Additionally, the case studies show that while there may be some potential for local content to promote greater national participation in the oil services sector, there has been very litle actual value production to date.
Some information has come into the public domain through courageous investigations that suggest that the owners were close associates of the president, current members of the civil or military arms of government, or current Sonangol oicials
23
. "s case studies, there is litle to say about the companies that are just bank accounts in the name of a general or cabinet member close to the president.
For the Government of Angola, these local "front" companies can generate negative publicity and sometimes great embarrassment when their ownership is revealed. Given their general lack of returns to their owners, it seems unlikely that such companies will persist. Additionally, the international oil industry is concerned that such companies tend not to pay their share of costs or participate in block management meetings. Of greater importance to the international oil companies, association with illicit companies connected to current government oicials creates a risk of prosecution for violations of anti-corruption legislation in many Western countries.
Company 1 was set up by an Angolan engineer with a background in government, Sonangol, and the IOCs 24 . Intending to become a successful entrepreneur and make proit out of oil operations in "ngola, he devotes himself to the business full time. "cting as Chief Executive Oicer CEO), its founder nevertheless has a minority interest in the company. It is probably the only private Angolan E&P company that is serious about being successful from a business standpoint. 23 See for example Marques de Morais (2010) or Global Witness (2009) . 24 For the sake of readability, each legal entity described as a case study is referred to as a "Company" even when it represents a variety of formal conglomerates, informal groups of companies and other legal arrangements.
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Although the company and its CEO are well known, the company does not have a website nor has its contact information been made public.
The greatest diiculty the company faces is access to capital. "ccording to the company's CEO, "[My company] is not going well. We are up to our necks. Oil production is a game for foreign companies. These conditions have to be adapted for us to survive" 25 . The problem, according to him, is that his company has to grow on its proits. Not only does it not have great access to capital, but it pays the same taxes and signature bonuses as foreign companies. However, unlike foreign companies, it cannot deduct costs in any other jurisdiction oice expenses, interest on loans, etc.) from its Angolan taxes. In his interview, the CEO stated his belief that Angolan companies must get preferential terms in order to survive and that promoting Angolan E&P companies should be a government priority.
Company 's staf is almost exclusively "ngolan, with several engineers that have experience in multinational companies. According to one senior engineer, there are few opportunities for Angolans in upper management, which is why he chose to move to Company 1. He complained that the major international operators are biased against Angolan companies and do not trust them. The senior engineer has actually begun registering his own company, which will ofer supply boats and provide some semi-skilled services such as reservoir engineering and production logging in order to take advantage of new policies promoting local content
26
. The conduct of Company 1 and the other entrepreneurial activities of its highly qualiied and professional staf show the dynamism and potential for "ngolans to contribute meaningfully to the oil sector if given beter opportunities to do so.
Company 2 enjoys much more direct support from the government and Sonangol. It is widely known in the industry that the company was set up by a former Minister of Petroleum, although formal ownership on paper rests with a variety of Angolans. According to two separate sources I interviewed, ownership may currently include high-ranking oicials in the Ministry. "lthough the former minister is not involved in day-to-day operations, at the time the company won its irst concessions, he was still in charge of the Ministry of Petroleum, which would expose several major international oil companies to anti-corruption charges in Europe and North America if his role in the company could ever be proven publicly.
The full ownership of the company is not publically known, and is said to be spread among numerous high-ranking "ngolan oicials. Company 's contact is more publically available than most companies in Angola. Although it is well supported by Sonangol (some informants claimed that it has received special concessions from Sonangol, which also acts as concessionaire for Angolan oil blocks), it is being managed in a professional way by individuals with the necessary experience and technical backgrounds and seems to be interested in business success. The motivation for this interest may largely be to show the industry that a private Angolan E&P company can be well-managed and successful. Although I was unable to conirm details with senior management despite several requests for an interview and visits to their oices, it seemed to me that several of the employees in their head oice are foreigners.
The company has also experienced problems raising capital and competing as equals with the multinationals, and has therefore advocated preferred treatment for Angolan companies. An Angolan oil insider told me that he saw nothing wrong with the fact that the company was protected and receiving special treatment from Sonangol in Sonangol's role as concessionaire. The real disgrace, he argued, is that this is done under the table and without admiting it. The insider argued that there is a mentality in Angola that prevents Sonangol and the government from ofering support and favourable conditions to all "ngolan oil companies in a transparent fashion 27 . While Company 2 is another professional and reputable Angolan oil company, this case also demonstrates how the promotion of indigenous companies in the oil sector has not been separated from the opaque and questionable accumulation strategies of the Angolan elite. Company was set up by a group of "ngolans, all former senior oicials in Sonangol or the Ministry of Petroleum, although none have been in their positions recently. It has invested in a small share of a few ofshore blocks but has not yet seen a return. The ownership of the company is not public, nor is the company's contact information. The director of the company, who is also its largest shareholder, told me that he felt pressured by the government and Sonangol to invest in these blocks because they want more Angolan E&P companies participating in the sector. He claims to have had no interest in forming an E&P company because he knows enough about the industry to know the diiculties in making them proitable. Instead, he had wanted to concentrate exclusively on oil services 28 . Without state pressure, even this group of knowledgeable and experienced "ngolans would not have chosen to invest in ofshore oil. This example demonstrates the complexities of ofshore oil production for "ngolan companies He has been successful in the hostile business climate of Angola because he offers quality specialised services for which there is litle or no domestic competition. Unfortunately, as he atempts to expand, he is meeting with resistance from Sonangol, which even tried to block one of his new joint ventures and force the multinational he was working with to choose a diferent "ngolan partner.
In his companies, the individual behind Company 4 tries to employ mostly Angolans. Driving this is a philosophy that: "The oil sector should not be an island that takes everything from outside and puts everything outside" 30 . Due to his contacts with the international oil companies, he meets their staf, and sometimes when he identiies a particularly bright or capable person, he tries to hire them away, a practice that illustrates the shortage of skilled engineers in Angola.
29 Interview, July 2010. 30 
Ibid.
Today, this individual is part of a group of senior experienced Angolans trying to form a new company to ofer integrated services to oil operators. In this way, he is continuing, along with a core of Angolans with high-level experience in the industry, many of whom left Sonangol around the same time at the close of the 1980s, to push new boundaries and be successful capitalists.
"y contrast, Company was the case that exempliied the worst aspects of the Angolan business climate. The company is an Angolan enterprise with three core businesses: real estate, oil and gas, and investments (including commercial businesses and agricultural projects). Most prominently, the company is involved in the joint venture between Sonangol and a major multinational oil service company. Its role in oil and gas, however, is simply to facilitate and invest in joint ventures (as a broker) and take a share of the new company. As one of the Executive Directors of the company (there is one for each of the three core businesses) made clear, they do not really even work directly in oil and gas. When I pointed out to the Executive Director that all three of its areas of business -real estate, investments, and oil and gas -activities in which the company is earning rent instead of engaging in production, he laughed and then agreed, without responding further 31 .
It is an open secret that Company 5 is favoured by Sonangol, which is why foreign companies looking for an easy entry into Angola seek it out. The company's Executive Director frankly admited that Sonangol often tells multinational companies wanting to enter Angola to contact his company because it is trusted 32 .
There are even rumours in Angola that the CEO of Sonangol is behind the company. While there is litle credible evidence to support this, I did ind that there are strong family connections between Sonangol executives and the executives involved in Company 5 33 . Acknowledging its good relationship, the Executive Director was deliberately vague in explaining how he maintained these good ties, at one point laughing when pressed and saying I had asked a very diicult question.
Another concern is that the majority of the company's employees are foreigners (although they should not in theory be able to get so many work permits). "ccording to the Executive Director, most of the staf is comprised of Indians, Brazilians, Portuguese, and some other Western Europeans. In his words, "We don't have Angolan people with the background to work with us". The direc-31 Interview, August 2010.
32 Ibid. 33 The exact family connections were described to me by a trusted source who is a close to one of the directors of the company, who is related to the director of one of Sonangol's largest subsidiaries. does not have to make any meaningful contribution other than to act as a front and is therefore not moving towards any kind of value production as opposed to rent-seeking. Another important aspect of this case is the operation of the purchasing contract, which shows several of the limitations of enforced local content. Chevron used to source certain supplies and equipment directly from U.S.-based suppliers. Now, the Angolan partner, Company 6, puts in these orders and the shipments go right from the supplier in the U.S. to Chevron. The company then pays the bill and is reimbursed from the purchasing contract. As a company employee said, "essentially we're paper pushers" 36 .
Despite the nature of the company and Chevron's questionable involvement in its creation, Company 6 has plans to build its own warehouses and stock the materials Chevron is likely to need, becoming more of an actual supplier and making a genuine if not signiicant economic contribution. It would obviously need to employ people to run the warehouse; however these will likely be the same people Chevron previously employed (at higher wages) to run its ware- This goal shows that they are taking steps towards the goal of producing and creating value. The operations manager admited that connections and contacts are critical for success in Angola, but argued that "you also need the know-how". His point was that "Once people discover you, you will make lots of money". The most important thing for geting started is to be known by Sonangol and the The company has struggled with the unfair business climate in Angola. Not possessing "protection" within Sonangol, the company's CEO described how he had been working on a partnership with a foreign scafolding company until someone at Sonangol decided the partnership should not be with Company 7 and forced the multinational involved to partner with a diferent, newly-created company 41 . Nevertheless the company has vigorously pursued new contracts, particularly contracts to work in partnership with multinational oil service companies that hold larger service contracts with the international operators. This strategy has allowed it to expand and, to some extent, prosper. This fact demonstrates that there is some room for a private "ngolan company ofering services needed by the IOCs to make money without strong Sonangol connections, though it is not clear to me that the company has sworn of the kinds of payments that are so common in all areas of the Angolan economy (see Hodges, 2004; Lopes, 2006) . The inal case similarly demonstrates a positive trend in "ngolan oil services.
Company is an "ngolan company, though it works in a few diferent joint ventures. It is a fairly large group, conducting business in Europe and the Americas.
The company's aim is to present itself externally as highly professional, similar to any Western corporation. It has a well-designed website with a lot of information as well as a series of policy documents seting out policies on human resources, the company code of conduct, health safety and environmental policies, and an Angolanisation policy, along with its contact information.
Although Company 8's promotional material is impressive, a mid-level oficial in the company admited that the services they provide the oil industry are mostly in catering and personal protection equipment, although the plan is to expand into engineering and upstream activities. He also conirmed that although no one on the company's board currently works for Sonangol or the Ministry of Petroleum, most of them used to and entered the sector through those connec- some of the multinational oil service companies as a subcontractor. In this way, they are expanding and ofering increasingly valuable services to the industry.
Although these case studies provide evidence for and against a change in methods of production and strategies of accumulation, taken together, these cases ofer evidence that a shift toward capitalist social relations may be underway. As the shift described above continues, it is possible that more and more "ngolans will begin to view value production as more proitable than rent-seeking. It is therefore in the context of a structurally diferent conjuncture -more than the context of agent-driven decision-making -that this transition is occurring. Although there were intentions among some large and some small companies to engage in increased manufacturing and value production, there remains a great deal of rent-seeking, along with many companies and individuals engaging in questionable behaviour. Over time, if this shift is actually occurring, more Angolan companies will become more involved in new areas of the oil services sector, employing more Angolan labour -both skilled and unskilled.
Conclusion
As with the favoured local groups in any postcolonial context, the Angolan elite are privileged. What is diferent, however, is the extent to which the system of presidential patronage, built up over Eduardo dos Santos' more than thirty years in power, has unparalleled power to reward the Angolan elites with the wealth the country is reaping from its abundant natural resources. The MPLA use the power they already have to atack civil society, limit freedom of speech and expression, and efectively control the print, radio and television media. They are particularly efective at controlling "ngolan society. Where they are unable to buy their desired outcome, they have also demonstrated an ability to resort to violence and intimidation.
Although these case studies provide evidence for and against a change in methods of production and strategies of accumulation, taken together, these cases demonstrate a discernible trend towards a shift to capitalist social relations in the oil services sector. More Angolans are taking seriously the possibility of running successful businesses by ofering quality services to the oil sector. Even those hoping to continue accumulating rent from the oil industry are recognising the need for international legitimacy. For this reason, many are preparing to ofer higher quality value added products and services in order to continue accumulating wealth instead of using their wealth for conspicuous consumption and/or moving it abroad. It is precisely this combination of transformations that ofers cadernos de estudos africanos • janeiro-junho de
• , -the possibility (though not by any means the certainty) of producing positive change in the everyday lives of large numbers of people.
By way of conclusion, it is necessary to consider what the shift might mean for Angola. Far from advocating entrepreneurship and business friendly developments as beneicial to the country or the majority of its citizens, this paper speaks to historical debates about whether capitalism is a good thing for Africa or a necessary step and contributes new data and understandings of the current conjuncture for oil-producing countries in the Gulf of Guinea.
In the case of Angola, this paper argues that the current transition seems neither positive nor necessary. The Angolan elite, and in particular the ruling MPLA, are adept at using public power for their own beneit. "s Vallée describes,
where the government of "ngola has made progress, such as in ighting hyperinlation, it has traditionally instituted the minimal conditions, litle by litle, not for the development of the country, but for the functioning of a renewed capitalism, that is still fundamentally rentier-based" (p. 30, author's translation).
Rather than a transition for all Angolans, what is occurring is a transition primarily proiting a small group of "ngolans connected to the MPLA; rather than representing the development of industry for all Angolans, it is a transformation for a privileged elite -an elite that, as compared to the elite in Europe during its own capitalist transformation, is much more centrally organised and hierarchically structured.
In response to my research project, economist and opposition politician Justino Pinto de Andrade commented that I could call my research an investigation into capitalist transformation -but that due to the kind of the capitalists emerging in Angola, the result for the country may be more akin to fascism (i.e., capitalism without freedom or democracy). The variety of capitalism articulated by Pinto de Andrade is a potential outcome in which the wielding of virtually unlimited state power by the Angolan elite guarantees a good business climate for individuals connected to the ruling party. Undoubtedly, Angolans can begin to invest in value production without creating a beter "ngola. The parameters of "ngola's future are being re-structured by a new historical moment for oil production in the Gulf of Guinea. It is therefore in this moment that Angolan agency can shape what that future will be.
